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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the extent to which U.S.-based multinational corporations are
affected by the alternative minimum tax. More than half of all foreign-source income received
by corporations in 1990 was earned by corporations subject to the alternative minimum tax. The
AMT rules potentially affect multinational corporations in a manner different from their effect
on domestic corporations. The paper examines the differential incentives the AMT creates for
locating investment either domestically or abroad and considers how the incentives for the
repatriation of foreign-source income are affected by the AMT. Tax return data of U.S.-based
multinationals are examined to see the extent to which these incentives may influence the
repatriation of foreign-source income.
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and NBERI. INTRODUCTION
The alternative minimum tax (AMT) was designed as part of the 1986
Tax Reform Act in response to concerns that a number of firms that reported
positive "book" profits to their shareholders paid no corporate tax to the
Federal Government. A corporation is required to calculate its tax liability
under both the regular tax rules and the AMT rules, and it pays tax according
to the system that results in the largest income tax liability.
The AMT rules potentially affect multinational corporations (MNCs)
in a manner quite different from their effect on domestic corporations. First,
the taxable income of domestic corporations (and that of the domestic
operations of MNCs) is generally increased due to restrictions on deductions
under the AMT and the inclusion of certain income that would be excluded
from taxation under the regular tax.However, for foreign operations,
deductions are quite similar for AMT and regular tax purposes.
Second, although the domestic tax base is generally larger under the
AMT than the regular tax, the tax rate on all AMT income is 20 percent rather
than the 34 or 35percentrate that generally applies to corporations under the
regular tax system.1 As a result, whether a firm pays tax under the AMT
depends on the particular sources of income and types of deductions received
by the firm. For U.S.-based MNCs, the lower marginal rate of taxation under
the AMT may present the firm a timing opportunity to repatriate income from
low-tax foreign countries. Repatriated income is less likely to be subject to
U.S. tax, or will be subject to a smaller amount of tax, because foreign taxcredits can shelter a greater percentage of taxable income.
Third, a separate AMT provision limits the total amount of tax that
may be offset through foreign tax credits. For a firm for which this provision
is a binding constraint, positive amounts of U.S. tax will be paid on repatriated
dividends even if the firm would otherwise have excess foreign tax credits.
The AMT affects a significant number of firms.2 In 1990 the
corporate AMT accounted for 8.5percentof corporate tax receipts, or $8. 1
billion.3 Including regular taxes paid by these AMT firms, AMT firmspaid
21.4 percent of all corporate income tax.Approximately 25 percent of
corporations with assets in excess of $50millionpaid AMT. Among the
largest firms, those with assets in excess of $500 million, the proportion of
firms paying AMT was 30.6 percent.
Among multinational firms, AMT incidence is slightly more
prevalent. This is partly due to the correlation between firm size and AMT
liability and the fact that the largest firms are more likely to receive foreign-
source income.4 Among firms in 1990 filing form 1118--the form on which
foreign tax credits are calculated--28 percent of those with assets in excess of
$50 million paid AMT. Among these multinationals with assets in excess of
$500 million, 33.3 percent paid AMT. Of all form 1118 filers, 53 percent of
all assets and 56 percent of all foreign-source income was accounted for by
corporations paying AMT.
The existence of the AMT can affect a multinational firm in a number
-2-of different ways, from the design of dividend repatriation strategies to
locational choice of real investment. In this paper we outline how incentives
can be affected by the AMT and present data suggestive of how important
these effects may be.
The next section of the paper describes the mechanics of calculating
AMT and the limitations placed on the use of foreign tax credits against AMT.
Section III considers the relative investment incentives for locating investment
domestically and abroad for an AMT firm. Section IV examines the incentives
for repatriating foreign-source income under the AMT. In section V, tax
return data of corporations are examined to analyze the prevalence of AMT
status among U.S.-based multinationals, their receipt of foreign-source income,
and the tax prices faced by these firms on additional repatriations of foreign-
source income. A concluding section summarizes the findings and suggests
directions for continuing research in this area.
II. DETERMINATION OF AMT
A firm calculates its AMT by making a number of modifications to
its taxable income reported for regular tax purposes. Here we briefly describe
the steps in calculating AMT (summarized in Table 1). More detail on the
most important modifications is provided below.
The starting point for computation of the AMT is the firm's regular
taxable income before any deduction for net operating losses (NOL). To this
-3-amount, the firm adds back a number of deductions that are restricted under
the AMT and certain sources of income not taxable under the regular tax rules
(adjustments and preferences). NOL deductions may offset up to 90percent
of this sum. Subtracting allowable NOL deductions results in alternative
minimum taxable income (AMTI). AMTI is then reduced bysubtracting an
exemption amount (a maximum amount of $40,000, phased out ratably to zero
for firms with AMTI between $150,000 and $310,000). Tax is calculatedby
multiplying this net amount by the 20 percent AMT tax race. Taxmay be
reduced by a limited amount of AMT foreign tax credits, as described inmore
detail below. This yields the firm's tentative minimum tax.Tentative
minimum tax is compared to regular income tax before all creditsexcept the
foreign tax credit and the possessions tax credit. If tentative minimum tax
exceeds this amount of regular tax liability, the excess ispayable as AMT, in
addition to the firm's payment of its regular tax liability. Each dollarof AMT
payments creates a dollar of AMT credits that may be used in futureyears
only against regular income tax liability. AMT creditsmay not be used to
reduce regular tax liability below tentative minimumtax.
A. Adjustments and Preferences
A number of adjustments and preferencesare added back to regular
taxable income to derive AMTI. The most notable ofthese are the
adjustments for depreciation and Adjusted CurrentEarnings. These two
-4-adjustments are examined in detail. Other adjustments and preferences include
amortization of pollution control facilities, amortization of mining and
development costs, basis adjustments in determining gain or loss from the sale
of property, income from long-term contracts and installment sales, merchant
marine capital construction funds, depletion deductions, certain tax-exempt
interest income, intangible drilling costs, and bad debt reserves of financial
institutions.
1. Depreciation
For domestic assets placed in service after 1986, recovery periods
under the AMT are equal to the asset's class life (ADR midpoint). These
recovery periods can be up to twice as long as those provided under the
regular tax. Depreciation deductions for equipment are calculated using the
150-percent declining balance method switching to straight line. Under the
regular tax, most equipment qualifies for the more accelerated depreciation
method of 200-percent declining balance switching to straight line.
Depreciation deductions under the AMT are also limited by the adjustment for
Adjusted Current Earnings, described below.
For property used abroad by a branch or a foreign subsidiary,
depreciation deductions are the same for regular tax and AMT purposes.
Foreign-use property of a branch is depreciated using the straight-line method
over the asset's class life. For property held by a foreign subsidiary, the
-5-Earnings and Profits method is used under both the AMT and regular tax (this
method results in depreciation allowances similar to those used for a foreign
branch).5
2. Adjusted Current Earnings
The adjustment for Adjusted Current Earnings (ACE) is based on the
calculation of Earnings and Profits. For taxable years after 1989, if ACE
exceeds AMTI before NOL and before the ACE adjustment, AMTI is
increased by 75percentof the difference.6
ACE includes items of income not included in AMTI, such as tax-
exempt interest, and ACE does not allow certain deductions, such as the
dividends received deduction.
For domestic property placed in service in 1990 through 1993,
depreciation is calculated using the straight-line method over the asset's class
life. There is no additional ACE depreciation adjustment forforeign-use
property.
Prior to 1990, a book income adjustment was used instead of ACE.
Under the book income adjustment, taxable incomewas increased by 50
percentof the difference between book income and AMTI calculated without
regard to the book income adjustment and before NOL.
B. Allowable AMT Foreign Tax Credit
AMT foreign tax credits differ from the foreign tax credits claimed
-6-by the taxpayer against regular income tax, although the process of calculating
them is similar. Under both the regular tax and the AMT, the foreign tax
credit that may be claimed in a given year is limited to the amount of U.S. tax
that would have been paid on the foreign income. This limitation is calculated
separately for each income category or "basket".
The U.S. tax that would have been paid on the foreign income is
calculated by multiplying (a) the ratio of foreign income to worldwide income
by (b) the taxpayer's U.S. taxliability(before use of foreign tax credits).
Under the AMT, foreign income, worldwide income, and U.S. taxliability
used in this calculation are all calculated using the AMT rules. The U.S.
component of worldwide income will differ from that used in the regular tax
computation chiefly due to the various adjustments and preferences described
above. Foreign income will vary to a lesser extent, because the depreciation
deductions taken for foreign-use property under the regular tax rules are the
same as under the AMT. Differences in the apportionment of certain expenses
jointly allocable between domestic and foreign-source income may cause other
differences in the ratio of foreign income to worldwide income under the
AMT. For example, interest expense is generally allocated in proportion to
the tax basis of domestic and foreign assets. The tax basis of domestic assets
will be higher under the AMT than under the regular tax since depreciation
deductions are taken more slowly. The tax basis of foreign assets is generally
-7-the same under the AMT as under the regular tax. As a result, a greater share
of interest expense is domestically sourced under the AMT than under the
regular tax.7
After computing the foreign tax credits for each separate limitation
category using AMT rules, a second, overall limitation is applied on the
amount of foreign tax credits that may be used against AMT. The combined
use of NOL deductions and AMT foreign tax credits may not reduce tentative
minimum tax by more than 90 percent. AMT foreign tax credits denied due
to the 90 percent limitation are treated like other excess foreign tax credits,
and may be carried back 2 years and carried forward 5yearsto offset tentative
minimum tax.
The following example illustrates the operation of the 90percent
limitation under the AMT. Assume the firm has regular tax liability before
any credits of $510,000 and regular foreign tax credits of $500,000. In the
absence of the AMT the firm would have total U.S. tax liability of $10,000.
Now assume that for AMT purposes, the firm has AMT NOL deductions of
$250,000 (line 4 of Table 1), AMT before credits of $450,000 (line 9 of Table
1), and AMT foreign tax credits before application of the 90percent limitation
of $410,000. Together the use of AMT NOL deductions and AMTforeign
tax credits cannot reduce the firm's tentative minimum tax bymore than 90
percent of the amount that would occur in the absence of NOLs and foreign
tax credits. The AMT NOL deductions had the effect ofreducing the firm's
-8-tentative minimum tax by $50,000 ($250,000 x .20), so that in the absence
of NOLs and foreign tax credits, tentative minimum tax would be $500,000.
The combined use of NOLs and foreign tax credits may not reduce tentative
minimum tax below $50,000 (a 90 percent reduction). As a result, only
$400,000 of AMT foreign tax credits may be used. Tentative minimum tax
is $50,000, and AMT payment is $40,000 in addition to the $10,000 payment
of regular tax liability.
AMT payment does not change the characterization of the firm's
regular tax foreign tax credits. The firm is assumed to have used $500,000
in regular foreign tax credits, creating neither a carryback nor carryforward
situation for regular tax purposes. Any of the firm's AMT foreign tax credits
denied due to either the operation of the separate limitations or the 90 percent
limitation may be carried back two years to offset prior years' tentative
minimum tax and up to 5 years forward to offset future tentative minimum
tax. The AMT payment of $40,000 creates $40,000 in AMT credits that may
be used in future years to offset regular tax.
III. INCENTIVES AFFECTING CAPITAL INVESTMENT
As described above, the depreciation deduction for foreign-use
property is the same for both regular tax and AMT purposes. Whereasfor
domestic property the AMT generally creates a tax penalty for new investment
undertaken by an AMT firm relative to the incentives faced by a regular tax
-9-firm, the opposite may be the case for foreign-use property.8 Under the
AMT, a firm claims the same depreciation deductions as it would for regular
tax purposes for foreign-use property, but income generated by the investment
can be taxed at only 20 percent under the AMT rather than the 34 or 35
percenttax rate applying under the regular tax system. If this were the only
difference between the regular and AMT systems, a firm permanently on the
AMT must have a lower cost of capital for foreign-use property than a regular
tax firm: The taxable income of the property is the same, but the rate of tax
is lower on the AMT.
As a result, under these assumptions, foreign-useproperty is treated
more favorably under the AMT than under the regular tax, while domestic
property is treated less favorably under the AMT than under the regular tax.
The AMT rules thus create an unambiguous reduction in the relativeprice of
investment in foreign-use equipment to domestic-use equipment.
Several elaborations to this analysis can be made. First, if theforeign
country's rate of tax on the investment exceeds the U.S. regular rate of tax,
then the foreign investment creates excess tax credits. Fora firm permanently
in an excess credit position, the foreigncountry's tax rate is the effective rate
of tax on this investment. However, because domestic investmentis still
discouraged under the AMT relative to the regular tax, the relative price of
foreign-use equipment to domestic-use equipment is still lower foran AMT
firm than a regular tax firm.
-10-Second, the cost of financing investment for an AMT firm is likely
to be higher than for a regular tax firm when debt finance is used. This is
because interest payments are deductible at the corporate statutory tax rate (34
or 35percentfor a regular tax firm and 20 percent for an AMT firm). The
after-tax cost of a dollar of interest payments thus rises from 65or66 cents
to 80 cents on the AMT.9 Thus while the absolute cost of investment is
higher on the AMT for debt-financed investment, the relative price of foreign
investment to U.S. investment is still lower for the AMT firm.
The magnitude of the change in the relative price of foreign
investment to domestic investment for an AMT firm to a regular tax firm can
be calculated. Because the assumption of permanent AMT liability is likely
to be an extreme one, it is worth examining the changes in relative incentives
for domestic and foreign investment for firms only temporarily on the AMT
with the incentives faced by regular tax firms.1° The calculations below
assume that the firm is in excess limitation status for foreign tax credits; the
investment is equity-financed so that there is no change in the firm's discount
rate; and all income flows (both receipts and deductions) on the foreign
investment are immediately repatriated to the U.S. parent (as would occur if
the property were held by a foreign branch). The corporate marginal effective
tax rate is calculated separately for an aggregate category of equipment and for
commercial structures using the tax rules in effect from 1990 to 1992.11
Table 2 compares the corporate marginal effective tax rates for
—11—equipment and structures under permanent regular tax status and temporary 5-
year or 10-year initial periods of AMT liability.12 For equipment located
in the U.S., a regular tax firm faces a marginal effective tax rate of 26.8
percent. The same investment located abroad faces a 38.3 percent effective
tax rate under the regular tax system. In terms of the cost of capital net of
depreciation, this is an increase of 18.6 percent. For a firm with an initial 5-
year period of AMT liability, equipment located in the U.S. has a marginal
effective tax rate of 32.5 percent. For this AMT firm, the effective tax rate
on foreign-use equipment is 36.8 percent. The cost of capital net of
depreciation for the foreign-investment relative to the domestic investment
increases by 6.8 percent.Finally, for the AMT firm facing a 10-year
temporary period of AMT liability, the marginal effective tax rate for domestic
equipment is 33.0 percent, while it is 33.3 percent for foreign-use equipment.
The cost of capital net of depreciation for foreign-use property relative to
domestic-use property is only 0.45 percent higher for this firm.
This analysis suggests that the AMT creates a relative incentive to
locate investment abroad rather than in the U.S. Of course, it can also be
seen from the table that foreign-use property is always treated less
preferentially than domestic property for a firm facing a given tax system.
Thus it is not correct to say that the AMT creates an absolute incentive to
invest abroad rather than domestically. Rather, it is the incentive relative to
-12-the regular tax system that favors foreign-use equipment investment over
domestic investment.
Table 2 shows that for investments in structures, the marginal
effective tax rate is very similar for both AMT firms and regular tax firms.
Even here, there is a slightly smaller increase in the cost of capital for foreign
investment relative to domestic investment for AMT firms than for regular tax
firms, reinforcing the results found for equipment investment.
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that the cost of capital calculations
presented here are based on a specific set of assumptions that may not be
generally applicable. In particular, it was assumed that earnings of the foreign
subsidiary were repatriated immediately. Because such income may be
deferred for U.S. tax purposes, the tax Status of the firm at the time of the
investment may not affect the cost of capital of foreign-use property. Rather,
the tax rate of the firm at the time of repatriation may be more relevant.13
However, even in the case where the cost of capital of foreign-use equipment
is the same for regular and AMT purposes, the fact that the cost of capital of
domestic-use equipment is increased on the AMT relative to the regular tax
creates a relative incentive for AMT firms to undertake investment abroad at
the expense of domestic investment.
IV. INCOME REPATRIATION INCENTIVES
The differences in statutory rates and foreign tax credit calculations
-13-create the potential for AMT firms to face different incentives for the receipt
of foreign-source income than if they were subject to only the regular tax.
Hines and Hubbard (1990), Altshuler and Newlon (1993), and Altshuler,
Newton, and Randolph (1994) have shown that firms take advantage of
deferral and timing opportunities to reduce their global tax liabilities on
foreign-source income. This section considers the different tax positions faced
by an AMT firm and its incentive to receive foreign-source income.
A number of potential tax situations might be considered in evaluating
the incentive for dividend repatriation and deferral. The variety of tax
situations is somewhat larger under the AMT than for regular tax purposes,
because the firm's foreign tax credit position for regular tax purposes--i.e.,
whether it is in excess credit or excess limit--may not be the same as its
position under the AMT. In addition, the firm may be in excess credit
position under the AMT due to either the separate income category limitations
or the 90 percent limitation, each of which may result in a different incentive
for repatriation.
Before considering the foreign tax implications of the AMT, itmay
be useful to examine the effects of an AMT firm earning additional income in
the absence of foreign tax interactions. Consider a firm that receives an
additional dollar of income that is fully included in both minimum taxable
income and regular taxable income. The net effect of this income on overall
current year tax liabilities is an increase in tax payments of 20 cents, and a
-14-decrease in the firm's AMT credits of 14 cents. This result can be derived as
follows: The additional dollar of income increases the firm's regular tax
liability by 34 cents (assuming it is subject to the 34 percent marginal tax rate)
and increases the firm's tentative minimum tax by 20 cents. Because AMT
is defined as the difference between regular tax payments and tentative
minimum tax, AMT falls by 14 cents. The net increase of 20 cents is the sum
of the increase in regular tax liability and the decrease in AMT.
Now consider the same situation, but additionally assume that the firm
had AMT NOL deductions that were restricted due to the 90 percent
limitation. In this case, an additional dollar of income would cause the firm's
net tax payments to increase by 2 cents. This is because the firm's regular tax
would increase by 34 cents (assuming the firm is subject to this regular tax
rate), but the firm's tentative minimum tax would increase by only 2 cents.
(The dollar of additional taxable income would allow the use of an additional
90 cents in AMT NOLs. AMTI would increase by 10 cents, and tentative
minimum tax would increase by .20 x 10 cents.) AMT would decline by 32
cents, reducing future AMT credits by 32 cents.14
Next we consider foreign tax credit interactions and their effect on
AMT liabilities.
A. Excess Credit Positions
Initially we assume the firm is in excess credit position for both
-15-regular tax and AMT calculations. An AMT firm could be in excess credit
due to either the conventional limitation on foreign tax credits based on the
ratio of foreign to worldwide income or because of the 90 percent limitation.
We consider both cases below.
1. 90% Limitation Not Binding
We assume that for regular tax purposes the firm is subject to the 34
percent tax rate. Under the regular tax, an additional dollar of earnings
repatriated results in no additional regular tax payments, and the stock of
regular foreign tax credits carried to another year increases by T* —.34,
where 1* is the foreign tax payment on this income.'5
Similarly for AMT purposes, assuming the 90 percent limitation is not
binding, the additional dollar of earnings repatriations results in no additional
AMT and the stock of AMT foreign tax credits carried to another year
increases by T* —.20.
If the firm was also in excess credit for the previous two years, the
foreign tax credits must be carried forward for up to five years. If 1* is less
than .34, the firm has reduced the amount of regular tax credits it must carry
forward. If T* is greater than .34, the only cost to a regular tax firm of the
earnings repatriation is if the additional regular foreign tax credit carryforward
created will not be used in the next five years. In this case, the firm might
have been better off deferring receipt of the foreign earnings until a time when
-16-the foreign tax credit could offset regular tax. The same incentives should
generally guide an AMT firm. The AMT firm, however, should consider its
ability to use both its regular and AMT foreign tax carryforwards in future
years.16
Rows 1 and 2 of Table 3 summarize these tax price effects for firms
in an excess credit position under both the regular tax and the AMT.
2. 90% Limit Binding
The firm is assumed to be in excess credit for regular tax purposes.
For AMT purposes, the firm is assumed to be marginally constrained from
using additional AMT foreign tax credits because of the 90 percent
limitation.17 For regular tax purposes, the effect of an additional dollar of
earnings repatriated is the same as above, resulting in no current tax liability.
Under the AMT, however, the additional dollar of repatriated earnings
increases AMT before credits (line 9 of Table 1) by 20 cents. Only an
additional 18 cents of AMT foreign tax credits may be used to offset this tax,
so tentative minimum tax increases by 2 cents. Because current regular tax
liability is unchanged by the receipt of this earnings, AMT increases by 2
cents and a 2 cent AMT credit is generated. AMT foreign tax credits carried
to another year increase by T* —.18.
Relative to the case where the 90 percent limitation is not binding,
there is a diminished incentive to repatriate earnings. This is true regardless
-17-of whether the marginal dividend is from a high-taxed country or a low-taxed
country.
One case in which an AMT firm facing the 90 percent limitation
would still have a tax incentive to repatriate earnings is if it had regular NOL
carryforwards that would otherwise expire unused.18 (In this case the firm's
regular tax marginal tax rate is 0 rather than 34 percent.) By repatriating an
additional dollar of foreign earnings the firm can essentially convert the
expiring tax shield into a regular foreign tax credit with a new 5-year
carryforward period. The cost to the firm of preserving this tax shield is the
2 cent payment of AMT today, less the present value of the 2 cent AMT credit
the firm will claim in a future year.
Rows 1 and 3 of Table 3 summarize the tax cost of earnings
repatriations for firms in an excess credit position for regular tax purposes but
subject to the 90 percent limitation for the AMT.
B. Excess Limit Positions
We initially assume the firm is in excess limit position for both the
regular tax and the AMT. Under the regular tax, an additional dollar of
earnings repatriations reduces regular tax liability by T* —.34(assuming the
firm is subject to the 34 percent regular tax rate). Earnings repatriated from
high-tax countries (T* >.34)thus lower current regular tax liability.
For a firm on the AMT, tentative minimum tax is reduced by
-18-1* —.20from the additional earnings. Since AMT reflects the difference
between regular tax liability and tentative minimum tax, AMT declines by 14
cents. Total current tax liability, the sum of regular tax liability and AMT,
thus declines by T* —.20.
The incentive for earnings repatriation is greater for a firm on the
AMT. The reduction in current tax payments is 14 cents larger relative to the
situation of a firm facing only the regular tax. Current tax payments decline
for any 1* >.20.The additional 14 cents saving today comes at a cost of
a 14 cent reduction in the AMT credit that could be claimed at a later date.
The first two rows of Table 4 summarize the tax cost of earnings
repatriations for firms in an excess limit position for regular tax purposes.
C. Different Regular and AMT Credit Positions
The incentive to repatriate earnings while in excess limit position
could potentially lead to a situation where a firm is in excess limit position for
regular tax purposes, but is in excess credit position on the AMT due to either
the conventional limitation or the 90 percent limitation on foreign tax credits.
As explained below, it is also possible for the firm to be in excess credit
position for regular tax purposes but excess limit for the AMT.
First, we consider the case of a firm that is in an excess limit position
for regular tax purposes, but is in excess credit under the AMT due to the
conventional limit. Such a firm lowers its regular tax liability by T* —.34
-19-from an additional dollar of earnings, but its tentative minimum tax liability
is unchanged. Since AMT is the difference between tentative minimum tax
and regular tax, AMT rises by T* —.34,leaving total current tax liability--the
sum of regular tax and AMT--unchanged. The additional AMT results in
AMT credits of T* —.34.A firm in this position faces no current cost for
earnings repatriations. Foreign tax credits limited under the AMT may be
carried to another year. The only cost of earnings repatriation is if the firm
anticipates prolonged AMT status and expects to be in AMT excess credit
position in these years. In this instance, if T* > .20, the AMT foreign tax
credit carryforwards might expire unused, and the firm might have been better
off deferring these earnings until it could make use of the AMT foreign tax
credits. (If T* < .20, the AMT firm benefits from using up AMT foreign tax
credits that would otherwise have expired unused.)
Second, we consider the 90 percent limitation. An additional dollar
of foreign earnings affects regular tax liability as described above for an
excess limit firm, decreasing regular tax liability by T* —.34.Under the
AMT, the additional earnings will increase tentative minimum tax by 2 cents.
This occurs because only 90 percent of the additional minimum tax liability
may be offset with AMT foreign tax credits. As a result, total current tax
liability increases by 2 cents. The savings in current tax liability relative to
the regular tax is .32 —T*.As a result, AMT credits decline by this amount.
-20-Relative to the finn's regular excess limit tax status, the AMT provides the
firm a low cost opportunity to repatriate earnings from foreign countries with
low T* (i.e., T* <.32).
These two cases are summarized in rows 3 and 4 of Table 4.
Finally, we consider the case of a firm that is in excess credit position
for regular tax purposes but is in excess limit position under the AMT. This
situation could arise where the firm has regular tax foreign tax credit
carryforwards (or NOL deductions), but these cariyforwards do not exist
under the AMT. Such a firm faces no increase in regular tax liability from
an additional dollar of foreign earnings. AMT liability increases by .20 —T*.
As a result, earnings repatriated from countries with T* >.20can lower
current AMT liability. The reduction in AMT reduces the firm's AMT credit
by an equivalent amount. This case is considered in row 4 of Table 3.
D. Summary of Repatriation Incentives
In summary, this section has identified a number of cases under which
earnings repatriation is favored for an AMT firm relative to the firm's regular
tax status. Table 5providesa side-by-side comparison of the possible current
tax prices faced by regular tax and AMT firms. For firms with AMT status,
the incentive for earnings repatriation relative to regular tax status is noted in
parentheses beneath the tax price.19
Of the six possible combinations of tax prices, in only one case is the
-21-AMT tax price greater than the regular tax price for all possible foreign tax
rates (1*). This case is where the firm faces the 90 percent limitation on
foreign tax credits under the AMT, but for regular tax purposes is in an excess
credit position. Even in this case, the firm faces only a 2 cent taxper dollar
of repatriated earnings.
In four cases, the AMT tax price is less than the regular tax price for
some foreign tax rates. In the remaining case, the tax prices are identical.
The analysis in this section suggests that in general the AMT offers
firms the opportunity for low cost earnings repatriations. The next section
presents data on the extent of AMT liability among multinationals and their
foreign earnings repatriations while on the AMT.
V. TAX RETURN DATA OF MNCS
Using Internal Revenue Service tax return information, we are able
to examine the prevalence of AMT statusamong multinational corporations.
We are further able to examine the receipt of foreign-source incomeby these
multinationals to explore the possibility that these firms alter theirpattern of
income repatriation to take advantage of the timingopportunities made possible
by the firms' AMT status.
A. Data Description
The data used in this analysis are from the 1990 Internal Revenue
Service, Statistics of Income microdata files. Twoprimary files are used.
-22-Data concerning general characteristics of firms such as assets and tax
liabilities are obtained from the corporate 1120 file. Data relating to foreign-
source income and the credit position of firms with foreign tax credits are
from the corporate 1118 file. Both files contain tax information prior to audit
or amendment of the return.
The 1120 file consists of a stratified sample of the corporate
population. Pass-through entities such as S-corporations, regulated investment
companies, and real estate investment trusts are excluded from our
analysis.20Firms with partial year returns are also excluded.The
remaining data represent 2,040,110 corporations consisting of approximately
55,000 actual observations. All corporations with more than $250 million in
assets are included in the sample, while corporations in lower asset categories
are sampled at a rate varying from 50 percent to 0.25 percent. The sample
includes taxpayers filing returns with accounting periods ending between July
1990 and June 1991.
Corporations included in the 1118 file consist of those corporations
on the 1120 file that additionally claimed a foreign tax credit on form
1118.21 An AMT firm that claims foreign tax credits against its regular tax
liability will file a form 1118. A separate form indicating foreign tax credits
used against AMT is not required to be filed. We estimate the foreign tax
credit position for AMT purposes by substituting the appropriate AMT
variables for the regular tax counterparts in the limitation calculation of form
-23-1118. The AMT variables are taken from the AMT tax form, form 4626.
A number of corporations that receive foreign-source income do not
file a form 1118. Such firms may be in a net operating loss position or may
have other credits or NOL carryforwards that reduce their tax liability to zero,
even before the use of foreign tax credits. The data in this paper regarding
repatriated foreign-source income consist only of those firms that claimed a
foreign tax credit.
B. AMT Status of Recipients of Foreign-Source Income
Table 6 shows AMT incidence for all corporations and for form 1118-
filing corporations in 1990. While only 1 to 2 percent of all corporations
incur AMT liability, a significantly higher percentage of larger corporations
pay AMT. Of corporations with assets in excess of $50 million, 24.6 percent
of corporations paid AMT. Among 1118-filers with assets in excess of $50
million, 28.1 percent paid AMT. AMT incidence is even more prevalent
among the largest asset category, those with assets in excess of $500 million.
Among all corporations in this largest asset category, 30.6 percent paid AMT.
Of 1118-filers in this largest asset category, 33.3 percent paid AMT.22
Table 7 presents the same information, but weights each firm by its
reported assets.23 Because AMT incidence is increasing with asset size, a
larger fraction of total assets is affected by the AMT than suggested by the
number of firms paying AMT. Nearly 40 percent of all assets reported by
-24-corporations are owned by firms paying AMT. Among 1118-filers, AMT
incidence is significantly greater when weighted by assets. Fifty-three percent
of assets owned by 1118-filers are owned by 1118-filers paying AMT. While
only about 830 form 1118-filers pay AMT, their assets account for just under
53percentof the assets owned by AMT-payers.24
The upper-panel of Table 8 shows foreign-source income and foreign-
source income as a share of assets for 1118-filers paying regular tax and
paying AMT. In total, 56percentof all foreign-source income is earned by
AMT firms. As a result, incentives for the receipt of the majority of foreign-
source income are governed by the rules and tax rates affecting the AMT
rather than the regular tax.
The upper-panel of Table 8 can also be used to examine whether a
greater share of foreign-source income is reported by 1118-filers subject to the
AMT than would be expected based on the share of assets reported by these
firms. As noted earlier the measure of assets used here may understate the
current value of foreign subsidiary assets. Additionally, because the measure
of assets also includes the book value of domestic assets, the ratio of foreign
source income to assets should not be interpreted as the return on a firm's
foreign assets.
In aggregate, there does not appear to be a significant difference in
the ratio of foreign-source income to assets for AMT firms and non-AMT
firms. For example, foreign-source income comprises 1.31 percent of assets
-25-for non-AMT payers and 1 .49 percent of assets for AMT payers, a difference
of only 14 percent. Of 1118-filers with assets less than $500 million,
however, foreign-source income of non-AMT firms comprises 2.47 percent of
assets, while for the AMT firms foreign-source income comprises 6.48 percent
of assets, a strikingly large difference of more than 150 percent.
The bottom panel of Table 8 presents the same data for foreign-source
dividends (except deemed dividends).25 Foreign-source dividends can be
viewed as a relatively more discretionary component of foreign income and
therefore may better represent the voluntary repatriation of income by the U.S.
parent. A similar story holds as in the top panel. In aggregate, foreign-source
dividends account for 0.86 percent of assets for non-AMT corporations and
account for only 0.72 percent of assets for AMT firms. The fact that
dividends of non-AMT firms comprise a higher percentage of assets than for
AMT firms is entirely due to dividends received by the highest asset category.
When only 1118-firms with less than $500 million in assets are examined,
dividends are found to comprise 2.00 percent of assets for the non-AMT firms
and 6.55 percent of assets for the AMT firms, or a rate more than 200 percent
higher for the AMT firms.
One would like to examine the 1118-filers in more detail together with
better information on their foreign subsidiary assets before reaching definitive
conclusions on how the AMT changes their behavior regarding the receipt of
foreign income. For example, in the case of the smaller 1118-filers, we need
-26-to distinguish between two hypotheses: (1) Because these firms were subject
to the AMT they increased their receipt of foreign income; versus (2) These
firms were subject to the AMT, but for reasonsexogenous to the AMT
treatment of foreign-source income chose to repatriate income. The second
hypothesis may be true for a number of reasons. Consider the possibility that
AMT status is indicative of low earnings and that these firmsmay be cash-
flow constrained. It might not be unreasonable to expect that a cash-flow
constrained firm would seek to increase its repatriation of foreign income.
The fact that low cash flow and AMT status are correlatedmay falsely imply
that the AMT status encouraged repatriations.26
C. The Foreign Credit Position of AMT Taxpayers
As described in section IV, the tax price of foreign-source income for
AMT firms and the advantage of dividend repatriation while subject to the
AMT relative to the regular tax system depends on both the foreign tax credit
position for regular tax purposes and for the AMT. As summarized earlier in
Table 5,sixpotential tax price differentials exist for a firm subject to the
AMT. In Table 9, we group each 1118-filer into these six AMT cells (and
two regular tax cells for non-AMT taxpayers)27 based on the foreign tax
credit position of the firm. The table separately classifies firms with zero
regular taxable income from those with positive regular taxable income. Firms
with current losses or NOLs are "generically" an excess credit firm for regular
-27-tax purposes (an additional dollar of foreign-source income will not give rise
to regular tax liability) and thus face the same incentives as any other excess
credit firm for regular taxes, but it is useful to distinguish among these firms
for AMT purposes. The foreign tax credit position shown in Table 9 is for
the basket category accounting for the largest share of the firm's foreign-
source income.28 The credit position is based on the last dollar of foreign-
source income received for the basket.
First we consider firms with a regular tax excess credit position and
with a positive amount of regular tax. None of these firms are in excess limit
position for the AMT, as anticipated given the lower AMT statutory rate.
Approximately 90 percent of these firms that face AMT liability also have
excess credits for purposes of the AMT and thus face the same marginal
incentives for dividend repatriation (343 of 385firms).The remaining 10
percent of these firms that pay AMT (4 firms) are subject to the 90 percent
limitation. These firms pay an extra tax of 2 cents at the margin for each
dollar of foreign-source income relative to their regular tax liability.
Table 10 displays the amount of foreign-source income for the same
cells as shown in Table 9. The 42 firms subject to the 90 percent limitation
account for approximately 13 percent of all foreign-source income earned by
1118-corporations ($11.34 billion/$88.40 billion) and 23 percent of the
foreign-source income received by AMT-payers. A maximum of $227 million
in extra current year AMT tax payments are made by these firms due to the
-28-90 percent limitation (0.02 times $11.34 billion), since these firms would
otherwise be in an excess credit position.29 Firms in excess credit position
for both AMT and regular tax purposes account for 27 percent of all foreign-
source income and 47 percent of the foreign-source income earned by AMT-
payers.
Next we consider firms with zero regular taxable income and positive
AMT liability. A small number--about 11 percent, or 28 firms--are in excess
limit position for the AMT. These firms have an incentive to repatriate
income from countries with T* >.20.Less than one percent of foreign-
source income is attributable to these 28 firms. A larger number of firms and
amount of foreign-source income is subject to the 90 percent limitation. About
4.5 percent of total foreign-source income and 8 percent of the foreign-source
income of AMT-payers is in this cell. Extra tax payments resulting from this
limitation are a maximum of $80 million.
Finally, we consider firms with an excess limit position for regular
tax purposes. A significant number of these firms also are in excess limit
position under the AMT. These firms save in the current year 14 cents per
dollar of foreign-source income received by being subject to the AMT. About
9 percent of the foreign-source income received by AMT-payers accrues to
these firms. These firms save approximately $590 million in current year
taxes on their foreign-source income as a result of being subject to the lower
AMT tax rate. Another significant group of the firms in excess limit for
-29-regular tax purposes, accounting for about 6 percent of the foreign-source
income received by AMT-payers, is in excess credit position under the AMT.
This group of firms saves the difference between 34 percent and their average
foreign tax credit rate (a number in excess of 20 percent) on each dollar of
foreign-source income received. Finally, a slightly smaller share of the excess
limit firms for regular tax purposes, 5percentof the foreign-source income
received by AMT-payers, is subject to the 90 percent limitation on foreign tax
credits. The 90 percent limitation still results in lower U.S. tax payments by
the amount that the average foreign tax rate is less than 32 percent per dollar
of foreign-source income received.
In sum, it appears that total payments of tax on foreign-source income
are lower for the AMT firms than if they were subject to the regular tax rules.
The analysis, however, has been unable to determine whether the increased
incentive to receive foreign-source income actually significantly affects
repatriation behavior. While the data in Table 8 indicate that smaller firms on
the AMT appear to have higher rates of repatriation of foreign income, it is
indeterminate whether this is the result of a tax price advantage of AMT status
or whether higher rates of repatriation are correlated with other factors leading
to AMT status. Extension of the single-period analysis over a number of years
for firms in our sample and linking the parent firm tax returns with
information returns on the foreign subsidiaries (form 5471) will allow us to
better examine alternative hypotheses.
-30-VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has shown the extent to which incentives of U.S.-based
MNCs are affected by the AMT. More than half of all foreign-source income
in 1990 was received by corporations subject to the AMT. As a result, the tax
prices on foreign-source income created by the AMT may be at least as
important as those created by the regular tax. While data shown in Gerardi,
Mimer, and Silverstein (1994) indicate that AMT incidence for the largest
corporations in 1990 was approximately 25percentgreater than in 1989 or
1991, the large stock of unclaimed AMT credits accumulated by corporations
suggests that the incentives created by the AMT will continue to be an
important factor in the future. As shown in section III, the AMT may create
a relative incentive for AMT firms to invest abroad rather than domestically.
For firms interested in repatriating income from abroad, the AMT may create
a temporary timing opportunity that allows repatriation of this income at a
lower cost than if the firms were subject to the rules of the regular tax system.
These two different incentives may have an ambiguous overall effect on U.S.
domestic investment if repatriated income is retained by the parent in the
United States. Alternatively, the two incentives together may suggest that the
AMT provides an opportunity for firms to repatriate income from foreign
locations with poor reinvestment opportunities and reinvest the funds abroad
in different foreign locations with better opportunities to take advantage of the
temporary relatively lower cost of capital.
-31-Section V presents data on the different repatriation patterns of AMT
firms and non-AMT firms. There is a general tendency for both AMT firms
and non-AMT firms with assets under $500 million to repatriate a larger
amount of foreign-source income (relative to the assets of the firm) than for
the largest MNCs. The smaller AMT firms, however, receive a significantly
higher share of foreign-source income than their non-AMT counterparts. It
appears that larger firms, those with assets in excess of $500 million, may find
permanent deferral of foreign-source income more advantageous than the
temporary timing advantage offered by the AMT. The differences in behavior
between the largest firms and the smaller firms may be consistent with the
smaller firms facing cash-flow constraints on their investment opportunities,
while the larger firms either have sufficient cash flow to undertake new
investment or can raise outside funds at a relatively low cost. We hope in
future research to examine more closely the differences in repatriation
behavior between AMT firms and non-AMT firms, and make use of
information reported by the foreign subsidiaries of the U.S. parents to
determine whether the pattern of repatriation from these subsidiaries is
consistent with predictions of tax-minimizing behavior of the parent firms.
-32-Footnotes
1. The 1993 Omnibus Reconciliation Act increased the regular corporate tax
rate to 35 percent for firms with taxable income in excess of $10 million,
effective January 1, 1993. The prior law 34 percent tax rate continues to
begin at taxable income of $75,000. Phaseouts of the benefit of lower
graduated rates under the regular tax create marginal tax rates of 39 and 38
percent for certain narrow ranges of income. There is no change in the AMT
tax rate for corporations.
2. Gerardi, Mimer, and Silverstein (1994) present data on the coverage of the
corporate AMT from 1987 to 1991.
3. The actual effect on revenues may be greater because most business credits
(such as the R&D tax credit) may not be claimed by firms on the AMT, and
regular tax firms may not use these credits or the AMT credit to reduce their
regular tax liability below the floor created by the AMT. The denied credits
do not show up in the data as additional tax payments, but are carried forward
into future years by the firms. As discussed in Lyon (1991), the AMT also
affects total revenue collections by changing behavior. To the extent that tax-
favored investments are discouraged relative to other investments, total
revenue collections may be higher under the regular tax.
4. For example, even in the largest asset category, 1118-filers comprise 24.1
percent of the corporations, but account for 47.7 percent of the assets in the
largest asset category.
5. Earnings and Profits is a separate measure of income used to determine the
portion of a dividend deemed to be paid out of earnings and the portion paid
out of capital. Earnings and Profits is also used in the calculation of the
Adjusted Current Earnings adjustment as explained below.
6. If ACE is less than AMTI, AMTI may be reduced by 75 percent of this
difference, but not to exceed the amount by which AMTI was increased in
prior years due to the ACE adjustment. The 1993 Act repeals the ACE
depreciation adjustment beginning in 1994.
7. The characterization of income across the limitation categories differs
between the AMT and the regular tax for certain types of passive income.
Certain income that would otherwise be placed in the passive income category
is placed in the general limitation category if it is high-taxed. Income is
determined to be high-taxed if the foreign tax rate on such income exceeds the
regular corporate tax rate (for purposes of the regular tax computation) or the
-33-AMT tax rate (for purposes of the AMT calculation).
8. While firms currently on the AMT are likely to have reduced incentives for
domestic investment, the overall effect of the AMT on domestic investment is
more difficult to ascertain. This is because the AMT also has an effect on
firms that are currently paying regular tax but that anticipate a future period
of AMT liability. These firms may have greater investment incentives
currently than if they were to remain permanently on the regular tax. See
Lyon (1990) for a discussion. The example discussed in the text considers
incentives of firms currently subject to the AMT.
9. The loss in the value of the interest deductions under the AMT serves to
increase the AMT credit a firm may claim in the future.
10. Gerardi, Mimer, and Silverstein (1994) present data on the duration of
AMT liability for firms between 1987 and 1991. Among a selected panel of
AMT payers, 70 percent of taxpayers had AMT liability for two or fewer
years of the five years in the panel. This calculation tends to understate the
time period over which firms are affected by the incentives of the AMT for
two reasons. First, many firms incurred liability in 1990 and 1991, and the
length of time these firms will remain on the AMT is still unknown. Second,
AMT credits may not be used to reduce regular tax liability below tentative
minimum tax liability. For firms unable to fully use AMT credits against the
regular tax, they effectively face the same marginal incentives as firms paying
AMT. Between 1987 and 1990, $17.2 billion was paid in AMT, but AMT
credits claimed between 1988 and 1991 totalled only $3.4 billion.
11. It is assumed that economic depreciation of the investment follows a
geometric pattern, so that returns on the investment each period are
proportional to its remaining value. Rates of depreciation are based on
estimates by Hulten and Wykoff (1981). Annual inflation is assumed to be 3.8
percent, and the after-tax real rate of return is 5percent.The cost of capital
for equipment is based on a capital-stock weighted average of the cost of
capital for 31 types of equipment. These and other assumptions follow Lyon
(1990). The corporate marginal effective tax rate is calculated as (,p-s)/p,
where p is the cost of capital net of depreciation and s is the after-tax real
return.
12. The period of temporary AMT liability includes both the period during
which the firm is paying AMT and the period during which it uses up its AMT
credits. Because AMT credits may not reduce regular tax liability below
tentative minimum tax, a firm does not face the incentives of the regular tax
system until past AMT credits are exhausted.
-34-13. The next section examines whether the AMT presents an opportunity for
repatriating such income.
14. If the firm had a tax loss for regular tax purposes, current tax liability
would still increase by 2 cents. In this case the 2 cents would be from the
AMT payment, so AMT credits would increase by 2 cents. The additional
dollar of income would not change regular tax liability, but it would reduce by
one dollar the amount of regular NOL carried forward. The reduction in
regular NOL carxyforwards can be thought to increase future regular tax
liability by 34 cents, provided the NOL carryforward period would not have
otherwise expired.
15. It is assumed that the foreign country has a classical corporate income tax
system. See Altshuler and Newlon (1993) for variations on the tax price
measure under split-rate and imputation corporate tax systems. The effect on
worldwide tax liability of withholding taxes, which may imposed by the
foreign country when income is repatriated, is not specifically considered here.
Tax prices examined in this section are based on tax payments to the United
States.
16. The scenario becomes a little more complicated for a firm in an excess
credit position under only one of the two parallel tax systems. This possibility
is examined in more detail later.
17. The firm could be marginally constrained on its use of NOL deductions
due to the 90 percent limitation. In this case, the following description of the
change in AMT liability continues to hold, but AMT NOL deductions carried
to another year would decline by 90 cents and AMT foreign tax credits carried
to another year would increase by T*.
18. A similar incentive exists if AMT NOLs would expire. Regular tax and
AMT NOL deductions may be carried back 3 years and carried forward 15
years.
19. Because the AMT only alters the timing of tax payments by the firm
(AMT credits may be carried forward for an unlimited duration), the present
value of the deviation between the regular tax price and the AMT tax price is
a function of both the current tax price, and the present value of the change
in AMT credits (as well as the change in foreign tax credit carryforwards).
Deviations in the current tax price are therefore more meaningful the longer
the period that a firm remains subject to the AMT and the longer that the
firm's foreign tax credit position for regular tax purposes remains unchanged.
-35-20. Pass-through entities do not pay minimum tax, although the recipients of
the income may owe minimum tax based on their own taxable income from all
sources.
21. Recall that the 1120 file is a stratified sample, but includes all firms with
greater than $250 million in assets. Firms in this asset category account for
over 90 percent of foreign tax credits. As a result, the stratification method
is unlikely to result in significant sampling error of foreign-source income.
22. Non-financial corporations and corporations in finance and real estate were
also examined separately. Among non-financial corporations with more than
$500 million in assets and filing a form 1118, 31.2 percent paid AMT. Of the
financial corporations in this asset category filing a form 1118, 38.8 percent
paid AMT.
23. It should be noted that for corporations with foreign subsidiaries, reported
assets deviate even more substantially from replacement cost than for domestic
firms. This is because the value of the foreign subsidiary is carried by the
parent firm at the historic cost of the equity in the subsidiary. In addition to
the deviation between current cost and historic cost of the original physical
assets in the subsidiary, the value of accumulated retained earnings within the
foreign subsidiary is not accounted for in the parent's books.
24. Of non-financial corporations filing a form 1118, 50.0 percent of the assets
were owned by AMT-payers. Of the financial corporations filing a form
1118, 55.8 percent of the assets were owned by AMT-payers.
25. Deemed dividends are non-discretionary in the sense that they must be
reported by the parent. (Firms have some planning opportunity on whether to
choose to earn income that would be classified as a deemed dividend.) Non-
deemed dividends may therefore represent the income flow over which the
parent has the most control. Note that in certain asset categories the quantity
of dividends reported in the bottom panel of Table 8 significantly exceeds the
net foreign-source income reported in the top panel. This appears to be due
to the reporting of expenses that reduce foreign-source income below the
amount of dividends received.
26. Using other data, Hubbard and Hines (1990) find a strong correlation
between foreign subsidiary dividend payments and parent dividend payments
that might be suggested by a cash-flow constraint of the parent firm. Altshuler
and Newlon (1993) find that the relationship of foreign subsidiary dividend
payments to the parent is accounted for by a fixed effect for the parent, rather
than the level of parent dividend payments.
-36-27. Note that even regular taxpayers can face the identical incentives as an
AMT payer to the extent that they are prevented from using AMT credits or
other business credits to reduce regular tax liability below tentative AMT. We
hope to separately identify these firms in later work.
28. For parent firms that are classified as non-financial firms this basket is
nearly always the general limitation basket. This basket accounts for about 90
percent of the foreign-source income received by non-financial firms. Most
of the remaining income for these firms appears in the passive basket. For
financial firms, the basket selected is the financial services income basket.
This basket accounts for 88 percent of the foreign-source income received by
these firms.
29. This amount is a maximum cost because some of the foreign-source
income may be fully shielded by foreign tax credits. It is only true at the
margin that an additional dollar of foreign source income increases tax liability
by 2 cents. Additional analysis indicates that the firms with foreign-source
income facing the 90 percent limitation on the use of foreign tax credits against
AMT are primarily facing the constraint due to the large amount of foreign tax
credits available to the firms rather than the existence of NOLs.
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1. Regular Taxable Income, before NOL
2. + Adjustments and Preferences (including ACE)
3. = TaxableIncome before NOL
4. — AMTNOL (up to 90 percent of line 3)
5. = AMTI
6. — exemptionamount
7. = AMTInet of exemptions
8. x 20 percent
9. = AMTbefore credits
10. — AllowableAMT Foreign Tax Credits
(i) U.S. Tax x (Foreign Income)/(Worldwide Income)
(ii) 90% limitation
11. = TentativeMinimum Tax
12. — RegularTax (before all credits except Foreign Tax
Credit and Possessions Tax Credit)
13. =AMT
-39-Table 2
Marginal Effective Tax Rates for Domestic and Foreign-Use Property
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
5-Year 10-Year
Asset Location RegularTemporary Temporary
Tax AMT AMT
EquipmentU.S. 26.8% 32.5% 33.0%
Foreign-use 38.3% 36.8% 33.3%
StructuresU.S. 35.6% 35.0% 33.3%
Foreign-use 37.8% 36.9% 35.0%
See text for assumptions.
-40-Table 3
Tax Cost of Dividend Repatriation:
Excess Credit Position on Regular Tax
Regular
FTC AMT FTC
Current Carry- AMT Carry-
Tax Priceforwards Credit forwards




(2) Excess 0 T* —.34 0 T* —.20
Credit
(3) 90% .02 T* —.34 .02 T* —.18
Limitation
(4) Excess .20 —T*T* —.34.20 —T* n.a.
Limit
-41-Table 4
Tax Cost of Dividend Repatriation:
Excess Limit Position on Regular Tax
Current AMT VFC
Tax Price AMT Credit Carryforward
(1) Regular Tax.34 —T* n.a. n.a.
Firm
AMT Position:
(2) Excess .20 —T* —.14 n.a.
Limit
(3) Excess 0 T* —.34 T* —.20
Credit
(4) 90% .02 T* —.34+ .02 T* —.18
Limitation
-42-Table 5
Summaryof Current Tax Prices and Incentives for
Dividend RepatriationRelative to Regular Tax Status
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